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2/22/83

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Security

FROM:

Policy and Plans Group

SUBJECT: SECOM Meeting of 23 February 1983

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1. The agenda calls for discussion of revised versions of DCID 1/14 and DCID 1/16. The latter, which concerns computer security, will be covered by the C/ISSG and/or [] in the pre-SECOM meeting. STAT

2. The pile of paper concerning DCID 1/14 can be reduced to three basic policy matters on which the Director of Security has already taken a position. They are:

° Include a new paragraph 19 that indicates the polygraph may figure in personnel security decisions if a department or agency permits use of the polygraph as a matter of policy. The paragraph is in the attachment. STAT

° Replacement of paragraph 11.m. with the attached and underlined revision. Paragraph I.B. of the attachment will not do because it does not mention the polygraph. Paragraph III is not acceptable because it begs the issue; it is not a clear cut statement that a polygraph examination may be conducted. STAT

° OSD, the military agencies and perhaps NSA will push for a 10 year background investigation in lieu of the current 15 year standard. DoD is under Congressional pressure to standardize their background investigations in terms of scope, so that coverage for TS collateral and SCI will be the same. The DoD proposes upgrading TS collateral from 5 to 10 years and downgrading SCI. As indicated on the attached handwritten note, the Director of Security was prepared to vote "No" to the DoD proposal at the last SECOM meeting.

° The C/SECOM has advised Maynard Anderson has anticipated rejection of the 10 year BI and may suggest an amendment that would permit an SOIC to "waive" the 15 year requirement. The C/SECOM was not responsive to this approach, since it defeated the idea of uniformity and would cause a number of problems in the exchange of certifications. It is recommended you oppose the "waiver" concept if it is raised. STAT

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3. An item not on the agenda is our nonconcurrence on 11 February with the draft revision of DCID 1/20, Security Policy Concerning Travel and Assignment of Personnel With Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information. The Director of Security noted with his nonconcurrence that the draft caused "serious concern about lack of flexibility in the document." This referred to situations when operational considerations and time pressure prevented a defensive briefing. If DCID 1/20 is discussed, recommend you propose an addition that would permit an SOIC some latitude in setting standards for mandatory briefings when such briefings are not practical.

Attachment



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